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Abstract 
 
We show how leakage differs, depending on the biofuel policy and market conditions. 
Carbon leakage is shown to have two components: a market leakage effect and an emissions 
savings effect. We also distinguish domestic and international leakage. International leakage 
is always positive, but domestic leakage can be negative. The magnitude of market leakage 
depends on the domestic and foreign gasoline supply and fuel demand elasticities, and on 
consumption and production shares of world oil markets for the country introducing the 
biofuel policy. Being a small country in world oil markets does not automatically imply that 
leakage is 100 percent or above that of a large country. We show leakage due to a tax credit is 
always greater than that of a mandate, while the combination of a mandate and subsidy 
generates greater leakage than a mandate alone. In general, one gallon of ethanol is found to 
replace only 0.35 gallons of gasoline – not one gallon as assumed by life-cycle accounting. 
For the United States, this translates into one (gasoline-equivalent) gallon of ethanol emitting 
1.13 times more carbon than a gallon of gasoline if indirect land use change (iLUC) is not 
included in the estimated emissions savings effect and 1.43 times more when iLUC is 
included.  
 
 
Key words: biofuels, market leakage, indirect output use change, carbon leakage, emissions 
savings, domestic leakage, tax credit, mandate 
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The Implications of Alternative Biofuel Policies on Carbon Leakage 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The issue of carbon leakage – where emissions reductions by an environmental policy 
are partially or more than offset because of market effects – is often raised as an issue that 
will undermine environmental policies.1 Leakage has been extensively studied in the cases of 
cap and trade policies (e.g., Frankel 2009),2 reduced deforestation and land degradation - 
REDD (e.g., Murray et al. 2004, 2009; Murray 2008) and indirect land use change (iLUC) 
generated from biofuels policies (e.g., Searchinger et al. 2008; Hertel et al. 2010; Tyner et al. 
2010).3 Each source of leakage has created its own controversy. For cap and trade, green 
tariffs and producer rebates have been studied extensively as remedial measures,4 while the 
Kyoto Protocol has been reluctant to include REDD because of concerns over leakage and 
additionality (Murray 2008). In the case of biofuels, the issue has been whether or not 
biofuels fulfill a sustainability threshold (e.g., a 20 percent reduction in carbon emissions for 
U.S. corn-ethanol relative to gasoline it is assumed to replace). However, leakage has also 
been a criterion to determine the eligibility of biofuels for carbon offsets in the Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol.5 
What has not been studied to date is the indirect output use change (iOUC) in the fuel 
market itself where the addition of biofuels always causes a reduction in world gasoline 
market prices.6,7 This paper develops a formal analytical framework to analyze the carbon 
leakage due to alternative biofuel policies, namely biofuel consumption subsidies (like the 
U.S. blender’s tax credit or a fuel tax exemption at the retail pump in many other countries) 
and mandates, and the combination of a subsidy and a mandate.8 In so doing, we identify two 
components of carbon leakage: the “market leakage effect” (also referred to as iOUC) and the 
“emissions savings effect”. The former refers to the resulting market effect of biofuels in 
displacing gasoline and other oil (domestic non-transportation and international oil) 
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consumption,9 while the latter refers to the relative carbon emissions of biofuels versus 
gasoline. A positive market leakage (which always occurs with a tax credit that expands fuel 
consumption) does not necessarily imply an increase in carbon emissions, but a negative 
market leakage (that is possible with a mandate) always implies a higher emissions reduction 
relative to what is intended.10 
We distinguish “domestic” versus “international” leakage. Because world gasoline 
prices decline with either biofuel policy, international leakage is always positive, as is 
domestic leakage with a tax credit. But domestic leakage with a mandate can be negative 
under some market conditions, making it possible that total (domestic plus international) 
leakage can be negative. For plausible parameter values we, however, find that, in reality, this 
is not the case as international leakage is much bigger than domestic leakage.  
Nevertheless, the level of market leakage for either policy depends on two key market 
parameters: (a) the elasticities of gasoline supply curves and fuel (gasoline plus biofuel) 
demand curves; and (b) consumption and production shares of the country introducing the 
biofuels. But leakage is found empirically to be more sensitive to elasticities than to market 
shares, and especially to changes in market parameters of the country not introducing 
biofuels. 
Domestic leakage becomes more important relative to international leakage as the 
Home country consumes more gasoline and/or the relative demand elasticity of the Home 
country increases. Our empirical results show that domestic leakage is less important for total 
market leakage compared to the case of carbon leakage – a result driven by the emissions 
savings effect.  
We show that a small importer (exporter) of oil facing a perfectly elastic excess 
supply (demand) curve does not automatically generate 100 percent market or carbon 
leakage. We also show that, under some market conditions, a country whose biofuel policies 
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have a smaller impact on world oil prices can see lower leakage compared to a country that 
lowers world oil prices more significantly. 
The economics of a consumption mandate is shown to be more complex than that of a 
tax credit because the former generates a U-shaped fuel supply curve. However, for the same 
amount of ethanol, market leakage due to a tax credit is always greater than that due to a 
binding consumption mandate. We also find that the combination of a binding consumption 
mandate and a tax credit produces greater leakage than with a mandate alone. If in 
combination with a mandate, the leakage due to the tax credit alone is infinite. 
If the tax credit is equal to the price premium that is necessary to generate the 
mandated amount of ethanol, then the tax credit exactly offsets the reduction in gasoline 
consumption due to the mandate if the country has no effect on world oil prices. However, if 
the country with the biofuel policy can affect world oil prices, then the tax credit more than 
offsets the reduction in gasoline consumption due to the mandate. 
For most plausible elasticities and 2009 U.S. market shares, we find market leakage to 
be in the order of 60 to 65 percent for all three policy options (a tax credit, a mandate, and 
their combination), i.e., one (gasoline-equivalent) gallon of ethanol replaces only 0.35 to 0.40 
gallons of gasoline and the rest (0.60 and 0.65 gallons, respectively) is displaced. This 
combined with the effect of iLUC makes one gallon of ethanol emit 1.43 times more carbon 
than one gallon of gasoline. Note that the EPA in its evaluation of iLUC using life-cycle 
accounting assumes a one-to-one replacement of gasoline with ethanol. On the other hand, 
the magnitude of carbon leakage is lower when iLUC is not taken into account, 20 to 25 
percent, (because the emissions savings effect is strong) but significantly higher, 190 to 210 
percent, when the effect of iLUC is considered that weakens the emissions savings effect. We 
show that iLUC is less important than iOUC.  
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Leakage under “autarky” can be interpreted as a measure for when all countries 
participate in the environmental policy (a biofuel policy in this case). We find that both the 
market and carbon leakage are lower by ‘expanding the coalition’ but not significantly so 
with the possible exception of carbon leakage with mandates but only when the emissions 
savings effect is sufficiently strong. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section defines leakage 
and explains two components of carbon leakage – market leakage and the emissions savings 
effect. In Section 3, we analyze market leakage due to a blender’s tax credit. The discussion 
includes implications for how country size on world oil markets affects leakage. In Section 4, 
we investigate market leakage under a binding consumption mandate and discuss the leakage 
effects of adding a blender’s tax credit to the mandate. Numerical estimates of leakage and 
their sensitivity analyses are provided in Section 5. The last section provides some 
concluding remarks. 
2. Market and Carbon Leakage Defined 
Whenever a ‘clean’ biofuel is subsidized or mandated relative to a ‘dirty’ source like 
gasoline, carbon leakage occurs - the actual carbon savings may be more or less than the 
intended savings (from biofuel consumption). Carbon leakage is a result of two, typically, 
counteracting effects: the “emissions savings” effect and the “market leakage” effect (also 
referred to as “indirect output use change” (iOUC), see de Gorter and Just 2009b) in the fuel 
market.11 To define the former, denote carbon emissions per unit of energy from a dirty (e.g., 
gasoline) and clean (e.g., biofuel) source by ed and ec, respectively. Define the emissions 
savings effectξ  to be the relative difference between ed and ec: 
d c
d
e e
e
ξ −=  
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The interpretation of ξ is straightforward. A value of 0.20ξ = means that a (gasoline 
equivalent) gallon of ethanol emits 20 percent less carbon relative to the same amount  of 
gasoline. 
While the emissions savings effect depends mostly on technical properties of the two 
fuel sources, the market leakage effect results from market forces in the fuel market after the 
introduction of biofuels. To show this, we write the initial world consumption of fuel, which 
is assumed to be all gasoline, as: 
0 0 0H FC C C= +  
where H and F denote Home and Foreign country, respectively. In the new equilibrium with 
E units of biofuels, world fuel consumption is given by: 
1 1 1H FC E C C= + +  
Market leakage (in absolute terms) due to the introduction of E units of biofuels is the 
change in world fuel consumption: 
1 0 1 1 0 0H F H F H FC C C E C C C C E C CΔ = − = + + − − = + Δ + Δ  
where HCΔ and FCΔ represent a change in consumption of gasoline in the Home and Foreign 
country, respectively. 
In relative terms, the market leakage effect is given by: 
H F
M
C E C CL
E E
Δ + Δ + Δ= =  
For example, if LM = 0.7, then one unit of biofuel replaces 0.3 units of gasoline, while total 
fuel use has increased by 0.7 units. Contrast this, for example, with life-cycle accounting 
which assumes gasoline is replaced by the biofuels gallon for gallon (gasoline equivalent). 
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We define carbon leakage in an analogous way to the market leakage: the change in 
global carbon emissions, due introduction of biofuels, is divided by the intended carbon 
reduction. The formulae for the market leakage and emissions savings effects can be 
combined to derive an expression for carbon leakage LC:  
( ) ( )1 1 1
1 1 1
d d H F H F
C
d
e E e C C C C C EL
e E E E
C E C
E E E
ξ ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξ
ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ
− + Δ + Δ − Δ + Δ − Δ −= = + = +
− Δ Δ= + − = −
 
which can be rewritten into a simple form:12 
                                               1 1C ML Lξ= −                                                         (1) 
In deriving an expression for carbon leakage, we realize that the clean source only saves ξ 
[×100%] carbon relative to the dirty source. 
Equation (1) clearly identifies the two driving forces of carbon leakage: the emissions 
savings and the market leakage (iOUC) effects. Depending on the relative value of the 
factors, three cases can be distinguished to determine the magnitude of carbon leakage. First, 
carbon leakage is zero, i.e., total emissions have not changed if ML ξ= . In this case, the 
carbon savings effect of biofuels is completely offset by an increase in fuel consumption, 
which results in higher emissions. Second, carbon leakage is positive whenever ML ξ> . In 
this instance, total emissions always increase. Notably, carbon leakage is more than 100 
percent if 2ML ξ> . This means that an increase in global carbon emissions is higher that the 
intended reduction in emissions due to biofuels. Finally, in the event that ML ξ< , global 
emissions are reduced. In particular, they decrease by as much as intended if LM = 0, i.e., if 
ethanol replaces gasoline one to one. Formula (1) also reveals that introduction of biofuels 
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can reduce more carbon than initially expected only when the iOUC effect is negative (LM < 
0), a situation possible only with a mandate as we show later. 
It is the use of biofuels as a substitute for gasoline that gives rise to the many potential 
sizes and signs of carbon leakage. The magnitude of carbon leakage also depends critically 
on the value of the emissions savings effect. For example, total carbon emissions could 
increase if coal were replaced with oil, but very likely decrease were the former replaced with 
natural gas. To illustrate the sensitivity of carbon leakage to the size of the emissions savings 
effect, we note that the direct emissions of corn-ethanol (as measured by life-cycle 
accounting) are 52 percent less than emissions from gasoline (EPA 2010).13 In this case, the 
magnitude of market leakage is multiplied by two (i.e., 1/0.52, as per equation (1)). But if 
indirect land use change (iLUC) is taken into account, then corn-ethanol only saves 21 
percent relative to gasoline (RFA 2010). The magnitude of the market leakage is multiplied 
by five (1/0.21) in this case (as per equation (1)). 
The formula for carbon leakage given by (1) is also very general; it accommodates 
both autarky and international trade cases; allows for any type of policy that affects the 
introduction of biofuels on the market; and it requires some estimate of the emissions savings 
effectξ to determine the magnitude of carbon leakage. It also indicates that carbon leakage 
can only be positive, i.e., total emissions increase, if market leakage is positive. On the other 
hand, there can be situations when carbon leakage is negative, i.e., introduction of biofuels 
reduces total emissions, even though market leakage is positive. The latter outcome may 
occur when the market leakage (iOUC) is sufficiently small and/or a biofuel has substantially 
lower carbon emissions relative to gasoline. 
There are competing methods to derive an estimate for the value of emissions 
savingsξ for a biofuel. First, one can compare the instantaneous amounts of carbon released 
when a fossil fuel and biofuel are combusted. In this case, the biofuel emits a different 
10 
 
amount of CO2 relative to the fossil fuel.14 Second, some argue that biofuels are by and large 
net zero as the amount of CO2 absorbed through the process of photosynthesis in growing the 
crop is equal to that when the biofuel is combusted.15 In this case, 1ξ = for any biofuel 
compared to a fossil-based fuel. Third, the life-cycle accounting approach measures all 
carbon emissions from “well-to-wheel” for fossil fuels and from “field-to-tank” for biofuels, 
which might yield yet another value forξ (e.g., 52 percent saving with corn-ethanol relative to 
gasoline (RFA 2010)). The fourth option is to add iLUC to the life-cycle value forξ (e.g., 21 
percent savings with corn-ethanol relative to gasoline (EPA 2010)). 
Implicitly embedded in equation (1) is the fact that the existence of positive market 
leakage undermines the emissions savings effect. Therefore, a question arises as to what the 
true emissions savings of ethanol compared to gasoline are when the iOUC effect is taken 
into consideration. A change in global carbon emissions due to the iOUC effect 
is ( )H F dE C C e+ Δ + Δ . Therefore, the true carbon emissions of a gallon of ethanol introduced 
in the market are given the sum of the own emissions of ethanol and the emissions due to the 
iOUC effect:  
( ) ( ) ( )1 1d d H F M de E e E C C L eE
ξ ξ− + + Δ + Δ = − +  
Substituting this expression into the definition of the emissions savings effect above, we 
arrive at: 
( )1d M d
M
d
e L e
L
e
ξ ξ− − + = −  
 This result is very intuitive: in the presence of positive market leakage, emissions 
savings of ethanol relative to gasoline are always lowered by the counteracting market 
leakage effect; hence never as high as supposed to be. In particular, if the market leakage 
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effect is stronger than the emissions savings effect, then consumption of ethanol does not 
reduce global carbon emissions, but increases them. 
In the theoretical analysis to follow, we take advantage of equation (1) in quantifying 
the magnitude of carbon leakage of biofuel policies in the fuel market: we focus on the 
market leakage (iOUC) effect and then just relate the results to carbon leakage. This is 
possible because of the one-to-one relation between the two forms of leakage. The market 
leakage effects of a blender’s tax credit (or a tax exemption at the retail gas pump as in 
Europe) are compared to a consumption mandate. In the numerical example, we also provide 
leakage estimates when a tax credit is combined with a mandate. 
3. Market Leakage with a Blender’s Tax Credit 
 Consider a competitive gasoline market in Figure 1 where the Home country (H) is 
an importer and the Foreign country (F) an exporter of fuel. The initial fuel price Pw0 is where 
excess demand EDH equals excess supply ESF. Initial fuel consumption is CH0 and CF0 in the 
Home and Foreign country, respectively. Similarly, QH0 and QF0 denote Home and Foreign 
country’s production of gasoline.  
Suppose there is a consumption subsidy (a blender’s tax credit) for ethanol in the 
Home market that generates a positive level of E units of ethanol production along the 
ethanol supply curve (not shown). The tax credit-induced ethanol is an exogenous (taxpayer-
financed) increase in fuel supply and can be depicted as a shift in SH to SH' by the distance E 
in the first panel of Figure 1. As domestic supply of fuel increases, excess demand shifts 
down to EDH', creating a new world fuel price Pw1 that is less than Pw0. 
With an exogenous increase in fuel supply due to ethanol production, fuel prices 
decline and total fuel consumption increases. The latter is market leakage (displacement of 
gasoline) and hence, unlike that assumed with life-cycle analysis, a gallon of ethanol (in 
gasoline equivalent) replaces less than a gallon of gasoline. With international trade, there are 
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two components of market (and also of carbon) leakage. The first is domestic leakage, 
represented by an increase in fuel consumption in the Home country (distance CH0CH1), while 
international leakage is defined as an increase in fuel consumption in the Foreign country 
(distance CF0CF1) (de Gorter 2009). With a blender’s tax credit, both leakages are always 
non-negative because each country faces the same decrease in the gasoline price. 
While Figure 1 depicts market leakage in its absolute form, an expression representing 
the market effect as a relative number makes it possible to identify its determinants, namely, 
supply and demand elasticities for gasoline and production and consumption shares in the 
gasoline markets in both countries. The formula for market leakage due to tax credit-induced 
production of ethanol in the Home country is given by (see Appendix 1): 
                                      ( )( ) ( )
1
1 1
DH DF
M
DH DF SH SF
Lτ
ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
+ −≈ + − − − −                                  (2) 
whereτ denotes a blender’s tax credit, ρ stands for a share of the Home country in world 
gasoline consumption, φ denotes a share of the Home country in world gasoline  production; 
andη denotes an elasticity. The first subscript D and S in each term signifies demand and 
supply, respectively and the second subscript (H and F) denotes country, e.g., DHη denotes the 
elasticity of fuel demand in the Home country. Decomposing leakage into a domestic DML and 
international IML component, the relative share of domestic leakage depends on consumption 
shares and demand elasticities in both countries, but not on fuel supply elasticities as leakage 
occurs only along demand curves: 
                                                             
1
D
M DH
I
M DF
L
L
ρ η
ρ η
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠                                                      (3)                         
Inspection of (3) reveals that domestic leakage becomes more important relative to 
international leakage as (i) the share of gasoline consumption of the Home country increases, 
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and (ii) the relative demand elasticity of the Home country becomes higher. Therefore, if a 
country (or a coalition of countries) producing ethanol consumes a substantial share of world 
gasoline, the bias of market leakage estimates when ignoring domestic leakage might be 
substantial. Likewise, if the domestic demand for fuel is more elastic and attention is only 
paid to international leakage, then the estimated magnitude of market leakage is likely to be 
an underestimate of its true value.  
How sensitive is market leakage to changes in market parameters? 
From equation (2), we are in a position to analyze the effects of the key market 
parameters on market leakage due to a blender’s tax credit. The partial derivatives of (2), 
summarized in Table 1, show that market leakage decreases, ceteris paribus, as demand for 
fuel in either country becomes less elastic and supply of fuel becomes more elastic in either 
country. An implication is that countries heavily dependent on oil, such as the United States, 
that introduce biofuels are more likely to see market leakage of their green (biofuel) policies 
abroad rather than at home. 
On the other hand, market leakage increases (decreases) with a higher consumption 
share of the Home country if the demand for fuel in that country is more (less) elastic than it 
is in the Foreign country. Similarly, market leakage increases (decreases) as the Home 
country becomes a larger gasoline producer provided that the supply elasticity in the Home 
country is smaller (bigger) than it is in the Foreign country. The above suggests that the 
attempts of countries to be less dependent on oil (i.e., decrease their oil consumption share) 
by progressively consuming more ethanol are likely to increase market leakage if the 
domestic consumers are less price sensitive in comparison with the consumers in the rest of 
the world. 
We use the results in Table 1 to examine the sensitivity of market leakage to changes 
in its determinants. Here we present a selection of the possible pairwise comparisons. For 
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example, market leakage is more sensitive to the demand elasticity of the Home country 
compared Foreign country if the former consumes more than a half of world gasoline               
( 1 / 2ρ > ) (see (4)). Likewise, the magnitude of market leakage will react more to changes in 
the Home country’s supply elasticity relative to the Foreign country, if the former covers 
more than a half of the world supply of gasoline ( 1 / 2φ > ).This is a result of the country size 
effect, i.e., market changes in the large country have a bigger impact (in absolute terms) in 
that country than in the small one. This suggests that the United States with values of 
0.22ρ =  and 0.07φ = will have market leakage that is more sensitive to market elasticities 
abroad. However, if we analyze groups of countries at a time (e.g., members of the Kyoto 
Protocol), then the situation can be reversed and the Home parameters can be more influential 
in affecting the market leakage outcome.                 
                           
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )  / / 1
( )  / / 1
( )  / /
( ) / / 1
( )  / /
( ) / / 1
DH DF
SH SF
DH DH DF
DF DH DF
SH SH SF
SF SH SF
a L L
b L L
c L L
d L L
e L L
f L L
η η ρ ρ
η η φ φ
ρ η η η ρ
ρ η η η ρ
φ η η η φ
φ η η η φ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = − −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = − −
                            (4) 
The four remaining rows of (4) (equations (c) to (f)) provide an explanation for why 
changes in world gasoline consumption (production) shares typically have a less significant 
effect than do domestic supply and demand elasticities. For consumption (production) shares 
of the world gasoline market to have a more significant impact, the absolute difference in 
respective demand (supply) elasticities has to be bigger than a consumption (production) 
share. But this is less likely to occur as demand elasticities are similar across countries. 
In order to get more insights into market leakage due to a tax credit, we analyze the 
key parameters at their limiting values. The findings are summarized in Table 2. If the Home 
country is the only fuel consumer ( 1ρ = ), ethanol production decreases the world fuel price 
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and generates higher domestic fuel consumption, thereby resulting in higher domestic 
leakage. Note that even though leakage in this case is by definition all domestic, it is not the 
same thing as autarky leakage ( 1φ =  would also be required). In the absence of gasoline 
production in the Home country ( 0φ = ), both domestic and international leakage occur 
because after total fuel supply has expanded due to ethanol production, the world fuel price 
declines, resulting in higher fuel consumption worldwide. 
If the demand curve in either country is perfectly inelastic (i.e., 0DHη = or 0DFη = ) 
then total leakage is either all domestic or international, depending on which country has the 
inelastic demand curve. If, on the other hand, demand for fuel in either country is perfectly 
elastic, ethanol does not replace any gasoline. This is because gasoline consumption has not 
changed, while total fuel consumption has increased by the amount of ethanol production. 
Market leakage in this case is therefore 100 percent. A perfectly inelastic fuel supply curve in 
either country leads to both domestic and international leakage. If the fuel price is fixed in the 
Foreign country due to a perfectly elastic fuel supply curve ( SFη →∞ ), then there is no 
market leakage (similarly if the country is an exporter). 
Some of the results summarized in Table 2 are of practical relevance to countries that 
produce biofuels, but whose global gasoline consumption or production shares are negligible 
(e.g., Slovakia). Despite being implemented by small countries, biofuel policies in these 
countries produce international (and also domestic if no production of gasoline) leakage 
whose magnitude can be substantial, depending on the market parameters. 
Is market leakage for a small country always 100 percent? 
One would think that a biofuel policy of a small importer (exporter) in oil markets 
that faces a perfectly elastic excess supply (demand) curve would automatically result in 100 
percent market and carbon leakage. However, this does not necessarily have to be the case 
and, under some conditions, a smaller country can see lower leakage of its biofuel policies 
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compared to a larger country. We summarize this by the following proposition on the case of 
market leakage, with the result holding also for carbon leakage as per equation (1). 
Proposition 1: Let there be two situations for the Home country, A and B, such 
that ( ) ( )A BG GdP dE dP dE< , where ( ) iGdP dE , { },i A B= represents the effect on world 
gasoline price of an increase in ethanol production due to a blender’s tax credit in country i. 
The gasoline price is the same in both situations. Then market leakage seen by the Home 
country in situation A is lower than in situation B whenever 
* *B B A A
DH H DF F DH H DF FD D D Dη η η η+ < + . 
The stars indicate that the fuel demand elasticity and fuel consumption in the Foreign country 
may differ for situations A or B. Proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix 1. 
A small country in international markets faces a perfectly elastic excess 
supply/demand curve. Conditions under which this is the case are derived in Appendix 2. Out 
of the three possibilities, we analyze the one when a country faces a perfectly elastic trade 
curve because of its consumption and production shares.16 In this instance, market leakage 
with a blender’s tax credit is given by: 
                                            ( )( ) ( )
1
1
1 1
DH DF
DH DF SH SF
ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η ρη ρ η
+ − ≤+ − − − −                                  (5) 
Consider a case where fuel demand and gasoline supply elasticities in both countries are  
-0.3 and 0.3 respectively, then market leakage is 50 percent – half of what it would be 
expected for a small country. 
4. Market Leakage with a Consumption Mandate 
The economics of a biofuels consumption mandate is different from that of a tax 
credit. It is because unlike a tax credit, which is a taxpayer-financed subsidy on ethanol 
production, ethanol produced to meet the mandate is financed by a money transfer from oil 
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producers and (under some circumstances) fuel consumers (de Gorter and Just 2008a; Lapan 
and Moschini 2009). With a consumption mandate, there are four distinct agents in the 
market: ethanol producers, gasoline producers, fuel blenders and fuel consumers. We first 
explain the basic economics of a consumption mandate under autarky and then analyze 
leakage effects of this policy with international trade. For a more comprehensive treatment of 
the consumption mandate see de Gorter and Just (2008a; 2009c).  
Consider the first panel in Figure 2. If a consumption of E gallons of ethanol is 
mandated, the ethanol market price (PE) is read off the ethanol supply curve SE. The produced 
ethanol essentially shifts the gasoline supply curve ST horizontally to the right by the amount 
of E, represented by the curve ST'. The U-shaped fuel supply curve *FS represents marginal 
costs for the blender (see de Gorter and Just 2008a; 2009a for details on how *FS is 
constructed).  
A blender equilibrates the marginal cost with the market price for fuel which is read 
off the demand curve DH. The intersection of DH with *FS constitutes a market equilibrium 
with a fuel price PF1 and fuel consumption of CH1. In the new equilibrium, less gasoline is 
demanded by blenders because a fixed amount of ethanol is mandated to be consumed. This 
results in a lower gasoline price received by gasoline producers PG1 and so gasoline 
production declines. Total fuel consumption can either decrease or increase, depending on the 
position of the fuel demand curve. 17  
How is it possible that total fuel supply can go up? Think of a consumption mandate 
as a tax on the gasoline market. Gasoline consumers pay a higher price for gasoline (to pay 
for high ethanol price) and gasoline producers obtain a lower price. So the mandate is at once 
acting as a monopolist against gasoline consumers and a monopsonist against gasoline 
producers. It is possible that the revenues extracted from gasoline producers are so high 
(inelastic gasoline supply curve) that total fuel production (and hence consumption) goes up 
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(fuel price goes down). Consumers still pay a higher price for gasoline but with ethanol 
supply, a lower fuel price. 
The economics of a consumption mandate with international trade is analogous to the 
autarky case above (with a slight change in notation). The Home country is assumed to be an 
importer.18 Prior to the policy, fuel demand in the Home country faces total gasoline supply 
ST) given by the horizontal sum of domestic SH and Foreign excess supply curve of gasoline 
SF - DF. When a consumption mandate is imposed, the total gasoline supply in the Home 
country shifts to the right by the amount E (depicted by ST'). An intersection of the demand 
for fuel in Home country DH and the fuel supply, *FS  defines the fuel price paid by fuel 
consumers in the Home country PF1. World fuel price is given by PG1. Since this is lower 
than the fuel price in the initial equilibrium, fuel consumption in the Foreign country goes up 
by CF0 CF1 (international leakage). Fuel consumption in the Home country can decrease (as 
shown in Figure 2), stay unchanged, or increase, depending on where DH intersects *FS . 
So depending on whether domestic fuel consumption decreases with a consumption 
mandate or not, total leakage may be negative provided that an increase in gasoline 
consumption in the Foreign country is more than offset by a reduction in domestic fuel 
consumption. We also note that even if domestic fuel prices go up with a mandate, GHG 
emissions can increase provided that total market leakage is positive and the emissions 
savings effect is sufficiently small. It can also be the case that even if the domestic fuel prices 
decline, global GHG emissions can decline as well, provided that the total market leakage is 
positive and the emissions savings effect is strong enough. Therefore, a reduction in the fuel 
price is not a sufficient condition for GHG emissions to increase. 
The analytical formula for market leakage with a consumption mandate MLσ derived in 
Appendix 3 takes the form: 
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− + − − − −≈ + − − − −                             (6) 
where 0E GP Pδ =  is the ratio of the intercept of the ethanol supply curve and gasoline market 
price under no ethanol production. The structure of the equation (6) is very similar to that for 
a tax credit in (2). The parameter δ is new and relates the ethanol mandate with the gasoline 
market. Close inspection of equations (2) and (6) reveals that a binding consumption mandate 
is always superior to a blender’s tax credit in terms of the magnitude of market or leakage. 
This is stated by the following proposition.  
Proposition 2: For the same amount of ethanol, the market leakage (and therefore also 
carbon leakage) due to a blender’s tax credit is always greater than that due to a consumption 
mandate. 
Proof: The proof follows immediately from the difference of equations (2) and (6): 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 1
0
1 1
DH SH SF
M M
DH DF SH SF
L Lτ σ
δ η φη φ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
− + −− = >+ − − − −  because 1δ >  
Market leakage when a tax credit is added to a binding consumption mandate 
If you add a blender’s tax credit to a binding consumption mandate for ethanol, the tax 
credit simply subsidizes gasoline consumption, thus contradicting all environmental 
objectives (de Gorter and Just, 2008a; Lapan and Moschini, 2009).19 Leakage due to the tax 
credit alone in this case is infinity. The explanation is quite intuitive. A tax credit does not 
induce any ethanol production provided that a consumption mandate is binding. It means that 
no gasoline is replaced by ethanol. On the other hand, additional gasoline is consumed 
(displacement) as a result of combining the two policies together. Following the definition of 
market leakage as the ratio of what is displaced and what is replaced, the result is that the 
value of the fraction is infinity. 
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However, leakage due to a combination of the two policies will be finite. It is because 
ethanol generated under a mandate does replace some gasoline and so the denominator of the 
fraction is not zero. However, total leakage of the combination of the two policies is higher 
compared to a mandate alone because of the additional oil consumption induced worldwide 
by a tax credit.  
Proposition 3: If a binding consumption mandate is combined with a tax credit 
equal20 to the price premium necessary to generate the mandated amount of ethanol with the 
tax credit alone, then  
i.) if the country is small in world oil markets, then the tax credit exactly offsets the 
reduction in gasoline consumption due to the mandate and market leakage of both 
policies combined is zero, 
ii.) if the country is large in world oil markets, then the tax credit more than offsets the 
reduction in gasoline consumption due to the mandate and market leakage of both 
policies combined is positive. 
Proof: 
Denote PF as the fuel price in the Home country with no policy. In this case PF  = PG, where 
PG denotes the world price of gasoline. Let PF' be the fuel price in the Home country when 
both policies are combined. The change in the domestic fuel price is then: 
( ) ( )
( )
* *
*
' 1 ' ' '
' ' '
'
F F F E c G G E G c G G
F F F
E G c G G
F
E E EP P P P t P P P P t P P
C C C
EP P t P P
C
⎛ ⎞Δ = − = − + − − = − − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
= − − − Δ + Δ
 
where CF' denotes fuel consumption with the policies in place, EP denotes the ethanol price 
determined by the binding consumption mandate of E gallons of ethanol, PG' denotes the 
world gasoline price with the policies, and tc*denotes a tax credit equal to the price premium 
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necessary to generate the mandated amount of ethanol with the tax credit alone, i.e., 
*
c E Gt P P= − . 
Substituting the expression for the required tax credit back to the above equation, we 
obtain:  
N1 'F GF
EP P
C −
+
⎛ ⎞Δ = − Δ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠	

 
where the negative sign of GPΔ follows from Appendix 4 and results in: 
( ) ( )F Gsign P sign PΔ = Δ  
Therefore, for a small country, whose policies have no impact on world gasoline prices, it 
must be that 0FPΔ = . This means that domestic and foreign fuel consumption does not 
change with the implementation of the policies and so market leakage is zero. A consumption 
mandate combined with a tax credit in a large country decrease the world gasoline price and 
therefore the tax credit more than offsets the reduction in gasoline consumption due to the 
mandate and world fuel consumption increases, resulting in positive leakage. 
5. A Numerical Example 
In this section, we estimate the magnitude of market and carbon leakage for the 
United States using 2009 data (see Appendix 5 for data sources). All data are in gasoline 
equivalents. In 2009, the United States consumed 22.4 percent and produced 7.4 percent of 
total world oil consumption.21 The share of U.S. ethanol production represented 1.3 percent 
of the world gasoline consumption. Baseline parameters in this paper denote “most plausible” 
values, based on the sources contained on the many other studies to date on the biofuel-fuel 
markets (see Appendix 5 for details). The fuel demand elasticity in the United States is 
assumed to be -0.26 and in the Foreign country -0.40. Elasticity of gasoline supply in both 
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countries is assumed to be 0.2. The ratio of ethanol and gasoline prices adjusted for miles 
obtained is 1.44. 
Using values of the most plausible market parameters (i.e., “baseline” values), 
estimates of market and carbon leakage are given in Table 3 for three policy options: tax 
credit, consumption mandate and when a tax credit is added to a binding mandate (here we 
use the actual tax credit which does not equal to the price premium due to the mandate). To 
calculate carbon leakage, we use two possible values for the relative carbon emissions 
intensity: with and without iLUC, i.e., ξ = 0.21 and ξ = 0.52, respectively. 
We begin our discussion on total leakage with international trade. The first column of 
Table 3 presents total leakage with international trade while the second column gives the 
domestic share. The share of domestic market leakage is the ratio of the change in Home 
country’s fuel consumption to the global change in fuel use (the latter represents market 
leakage in absolute terms). All ethanol is assumed to be consumed domestically.  
Total leakage with a tax credit is 0.65 (i.e., 65 percent, when multiplied by 100), while 
the share of domestic leakage is only 16 percent. Because the United States is one of the 
biggest consumers and importers of oil in the world, results in Table 3 and equation (3) 
suggest that the domestic share is lower in countries like Canada. On the other hand, recall 
that it is very possible for ‘small’ exporting countries to have a higher total leakage than the 
United States, depending on how elastic the fuel demand curve in the rest of the world is and 
how big the consumption share of the exporting country is relative to that of the United 
States.  
With a mandate, on the other hand, domestic leakage is negative (total fuel 
consumption declines), but domestic leakage is low, while total leakage is 61 percent. Total 
leakage with a mandate does not differ much from that due to a tax credit because the level of 
domestic leakage is low relative to international leakage; the latter always being  positive. 
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This result occurs even with the United States consuming close to one quarter of total world 
oil consumption.  
The third row in Table 3 shows the market leakage when the tax credit is added to a 
binding mandate and total leakage is close to that with a consumption mandate alone. This is 
because after the tax credit is added, the fuel supply curve does not shift down by the full tax 
credit, but only approximately by the share of ethanol multiplied by the tax credit. 
The bottom set of results in Table 3 gives carbon leakage under two scenarios: with 
iLUC using the EPA’s most recent estimate (where corn based ethanol emits 21 percent less 
CO2 relative to gasoline) and without iLUC (where ethanol emits 52 percent less CO2 
compared to gasoline). Unlike market leakage, total carbon leakage when including iLUC22 is 
much higher for all three policy scenarios. This is because carbon leakage is a compound 
measure consisting of two mutually synergizing sources through which a policy generates 
leakage: the market leakage effect, i.e., via changes in physical quantities of fuel consumed; 
and the emissions savings effect where gasoline  is being replaced by a biofuel with lower 
carbon emissions. For example, market leakage for a tax credit is 65 percent while carbon 
leakage is 209 percent when carbon emissions due to iLUC are taken into account. Carbon 
leakage is so much higher in this case because the carbon savings of 21 percent per gallon of 
ethanol relative to gasoline are more than offset by a world-wide carbon increase due to 
higher fuel consumption. This means that, for given parameters, the increase in global carbon 
emissions is approximately twice as big as the intended reduction due to ethanol production. 
On the other hand, total carbon leakage is much lower than market leakage when 
evaluating the former excluding iLUC, using the most up to date EPA estimates of direct life-
cycle accounting (for new plants using specific technologies and inputs e.g., natural gas).23 
Looking at the last set of results in the first column of Table 3, carbon leakage is much lower 
than market leakage when excluding iLUC. This differential effect can be explained by much 
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stronger carbon emissions savings (52 vs 21 percent) of ethanol that now alleviates the 
generation of carbon through higher fuel consumption more significantly relative to the 
previous case where iLUC is not included in the emissions savings parameter. 
Another unique feature of the results in Table 3 is comparing the domestic share of 
carbon leakage with that of market leakage. The importance of domestic carbon leakage is 
more pronounced when excluding iLUC. The intuition for why domestic carbon leakage, for 
given parameters, is negative and very high in absolute terms (especially when ξ is high) is as 
follows. Domestic gasoline consumption declines, regardless if a tax credit or a mandate, 
thereby significantly lowering domestic carbon emissions. These emissions increase again as 
ethanol replaces the decline in gasoline consumption, but the replaced amount of emissions is 
lower than before because ethanol has lower emissions relative to gasoline (the more so as ξ 
increases).  
We have shown in equation (1) that a higher emissions savings parameter for ethanol 
alleviates total carbon leakage. In the previous paragraph, we also explained why higher 
emissions savings with ethanol reduces domestic carbon emissions. Therefore, a higher value 
of ξ increases domestic carbon savings (the numerator) and at the same time reduces total 
carbon leakage (the denominator), making the domestic share of carbon leakage much bigger 
(in absolute terms). Notice that total carbon leakage is nowhere negative in Table 3 and is 
small for ξ = 0.52. This is because international carbon leakage, albeit being very high, is 
offset by negative domestic leakage, resulting in total leakage (i.e., the sum of domestic and 
international leakage) reported in the bottom section of Table 3.  
We now turn to the third column of Table 3 that presents estimates of autarky leakage. 
We present autarky leakage as an estimate of what leakage would be if all countries in the 
world adopted the biofuel policy. The first thing to note is that market leakage under autarky 
(where the United States in this case adopts the biofuel policy) does not differ very much 
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from that of total market leakage under international trade – the difference being only 10 
percentage points.24 Therefore, “expanding the coalition” is not a critical issue in the case of 
biofuel policy and climate change (unlike for cap and trade or REDD – Murray 2008). Only 
in the case of high values for the emissions savings effect does carbon leakage drop 
significantly for autarky leakage (compare first and last columns of Table 3 for last three 
rows). This is because a higher emissions savings effect makes, the carbon and market 
leakage measures diverge. In this case, the emissions savings effect, which always reduces 
carbon leakage, almost completely offsets the market leakage effect, resulting in a very low 
carbon leakage.   
Previous studies analyzing the impact of a tax credit and/or a mandate on leakage 
assume autarky (de Gorter and Just 2008a; 2009a; Holland et al. 2009). With a consumption 
mandate, they find both positive and negative market leakage for plausible elasticity values. 
In our simulations (not reported), leakage is almost always underestimated assuming autarky 
when U.S. supply is assumed to be more elastic but it is likely to be overestimated (for a 
fixed value of the demand elasticity) when the U.S. demand for fuel is assumed to be more 
elastic. The U.S. biofuel policies certainly have an impact on international markets. 
Therefore, modeling leakage assuming autarky biases the results. 
Finally, in the fourth and fifth column of Table 3, we present the “true carbon 
savings” of ethanol relative to gasoline, when the effect of iOUC is included for the case of 
international trade and autarky. These values were calculated by taking the difference 
between the emissions savings effect including (or excluding) iLUC and the magnitude of 
market leakage. The negative sign of the difference in all instances suggests that after taking 
into consideration the market leakage effect, corn-ethanol emits more carbon emissions than 
does gasoline. For example, the value of -0.43 in the fourth column means that one (gasoline-
equivalent) gallon of ethanol emits 1.43 times more carbon than 1 gallon of gasoline.  
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Sensitivity analysis on the changes in key parameters affecting the magnitude of 
leakages is presented in Tables 4a and 4b. The organization of data is identical in both tables: 
values of elasticities are changed one at a time, keeping other parameters at their baseline 
levels (baseline leakage values are highlighted).25 In Table 4a, we assume a scenario that 
includes indirect land use change (iLUC) while in Table 4b, iLUC is ignored. Since the 
carbon emissions savings parameter only influences carbon leakage, we do not report the 
magnitudes of market leakage in Table 4b to avoid repetition. 
Consistent with the theoretical predictions in Table 1, leakage decreases as the 
gasoline supply curve in both countries becomes more elastic and increases as the elasticity 
of demand for fuel increases. Elasticities in the Foreign country have a bigger impact on 
leakage relative to the domestic ones because the United States consumes and produces less 
than a half of world’s gasoline. With inelastic demand and supply curves (which is most 
likely the case in reality), carbon leakage typically exceeds 100 percent when we assume an 
emissions savings parameter of U.S. corn-ethanol of 21 percent compared to gasoline. On the 
other hand, if the emissions savings parameter is much higher (e.g., ξ = 0.52 as in most recent 
EPA estimate of direct emissions using life-cycle accounting that excludes iLUC), then U.S. 
corn-ethanol is likely to reduce global carbon emissions substantially (Table 4b). Comparing 
Table 4a to 4b for carbon leakage, we observe that the odds that a more-than-expected 
amount of carbon will be saved increases as the emissions associated with ethanol declines (9 
negative carbon leakage values in Table 4a vs 26 in Table 4b).Therefore, in order to evaluate 
the effects of ethanol production on the global carbon emissions, we not only need reliable 
estimates of how much lower ethanol emissions are compared to gasoline, but also an 
agreement on whether to include iLUC or not.26 
6. Conclusions 
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Leakage is a measure of the ineffectiveness of an environmental policy and is 
frequently discussed in the context of combating global climate change. We develop an 
analytical framework to analyze the carbon leakage due to alternative biofuel policies, 
namely consumption subsidies and mandates (and their combination). We identify two 
components of carbon leakage: the market leakage effect, also referred to as indirect output 
use change (iOUC), and the emissions savings effect. Market leakage results from a change 
in market prices and a subsequent displacement of gasoline and other oil uses by biofuels, 
while the emissions savings effect represents the relative emissions of biofuels versus 
gasoline. We find that a positive market leakage does not necessarily imply an increase in 
carbon emissions, but a negative market leakage (that may occur with a mandate) always 
implies a higher emissions reduction relative to what is intended. 
The international trade framework within which we analyze a blender’s tax credit and 
a consumption mandate gives rise to a distinction between domestic and international 
leakage. Domestic leakage, under plausible assumptions, can be a significant factor of total 
leakage. With numerical simulations, we show why domestic leakage should be included in 
leakage estimates of various policies and what biases result from not doing so. Because world 
gasoline prices decline with either biofuel policy, international leakage is always positive, as 
is domestic leakage with a tax credit. But domestic leakage with a mandate can be negative, 
making it possible that total (domestic plus international) leakage can be negative.  
We show that market leakages (and hence carbon leakage) with both biofuel policies 
depend on two groups of parameters: (1) the elasticities of gasoline supply curves and fuel 
demand curves; and (2) consumption and production shares of the country introducing the 
biofuels. We demonstrate that leakage is typically more sensitive to elasticities than to market 
shares, and is especially more sensitive to changes in market parameters of the country not 
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introducing biofuels. We also find that being a relatively smaller country in world oil markets 
does not automatically imply a lower leakage. 
For the same amount of ethanol, market leakage due to a tax credit is always greater 
than that due to a binding consumption mandate while the combination of a binding mandate 
and a tax credit produces greater leakage than a mandate alone. A tax credit equal to the price 
premium that is necessary to generate the mandated amount of ethanol combined with a 
binding mandate exactly offsets the reduction in gasoline consumption due to the mandate if 
the country has no impact on world oil prices, but more than offsets the reduction if the 
country does impact oil prices. 
Our numerical estimates for the United States in 2009 reveal market leakage to be 
between 60 and 65 percent for all three policy options (i.e., tax credit, a mandate, and their 
combination). This translates into the carbon leakage of 190 to 210 percent provided iLUC is 
taken into account and it ranges from 20 to 25 percent when excluding iLUC. We find that 
existing indirect output changes reduce the ability of ethanol to save carbon emissions 
relative to gasoline and the empirical results for the U.S. policies result in ethanol emitting 
more carbon than gasoline – between 1.09 to 1.44 times more, depending on a policy and 
whether or not iLUC is considered.  
The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests leakage from biofuel policy 
could be substantial. Leakage from biofuels policies is difficult to address in policy design 
because a mandate does not help much due to international leakage overriding a potential 
negative domestic leakage. Leakage from biofuel policies is also a special problem from a 
policy standpoint because, unlike with leakage in a cap and trade or REDD scheme, the 
problem is not always solved by having all countries adopt a biofuels policy because all 
leakage will be “autarky” (i.e., “domestic” if the coalition is expended to all countries 
adopting a biofuels policy) but this will likely result in little savings compared to the case if 
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the United States was the only country with the biofuels policy. There is one possible 
exception: if the emissions savings effect ξ is high enough (i.e., if iLUC is ignored and ξ is 
around 0.50), then if every country adopts a mandate, there can be negative carbon leakage 
worldwide. 
The framework advanced in this paper on leakage assumes the supply curve for 
gasoline is fixed. But an emerging literature on the Green paradox suggests that the 
introduction of biofuels shifts the gasoline supply curve down as owners of non-renewable 
resources worry about the rate of capital gains on these resources and so are motivated to 
extract their stocks of oil more rapidly in order to convert a larger portion of their wealth into 
cash and securing it as financial capital (Sinn 2008; 2009; Eichner and Pething 2009; Hoel 
2008; Grafton et al. 2010). So the estimates of leakage in this paper may be underestimated if 
aspects of the Green paradox are not included. 
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Table 1: Effect of changes in market parameters on market leakage with a tax credit  
Change in market leakage with respect to: Magnitude of the effect Sign of the effect Note 
Domestic fuel demand elasticity ( DHη ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )2
1
1 1
SH SF
DH DF SH SF
ρ φη φ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
+ −− + − − − −  (-) unambiguous sign 
Foreign fuel demand elasticity ( DFη ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )2
1 1
1 1
SH SF
DH DF SH SF
ρ φη φ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
− + −− + − − − −  (-) unambiguous sign 
Domestic gasoline supply elasticity ( SHη ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )2
1
1 1
DH DF
DH DF SH SF
φ ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
+ −
+ − − − −  (-) unambiguous sign 
Foreign gasoline supply elasticity ( SFη ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )2
1 1
1 1
DH DF
DH DF SH SF
φ ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
− + −
+ − − − −  (-) unambiguous sign 
Domestic consumption share in world 
gasoline consumption ( ρ ) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )2
1
1 1
DH DF SH SF
DH DF SH SF
η η φη φ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
− + −− + − − − −  
(+) for DH DFη η<  
(-) for DH DFη η>  
Domestic production share in world gasoline 
production (φ ) 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )2
1
1 1
SH SF DH DF
DH DF SH SF
η η ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
− + −
+ − − − −  
(+) for SH SFη η<  
(-) for SH SFη η>  
Source: calculated
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Table 2: Effect on market leakage with a tax credit when parameters take on limiting values*          
         Limiting value of a parameter Magnitude of market leakage Interval of magnitude Location of leakage** 
1. 
Home country consumes all 
gasoline ( 1ρ = ) ( )1DHDH SH SF
η
η φη φ η− − −  between 0 and 1 domestic 
2. 
Home country consumes no 
gasoline ( 0ρ = ) ( )1DFDF SH SF
η
η φη φ η− − −  between 0 and 1 international 
3. 
Home country produces all gasoline 
( 1φ = ) 
( )
( )
1
1
DH DF
DH DF SH
ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η η
+ −
+ − −  between 0 and 1 domestic & international
4. 
Home country produces no gasoline 
( 0φ = ) 
( )
( )
1
1
DH DF
DH DF SF
ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η η
+ −
+ − −  between 0 and 1 domestic & international
5. 
Fuel demand in Home country is 
perfectly inelastic ( 0DHη = ) 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
DF
DF SH SF
ρ η
ρ η φη φ η
−
− − − −  between 0 and 1 international 
6. 
Fuel demand in Home country is 
perfectly elastic ( DHη → −∞ ) 1 1 domestic 
7. 
Fuel demand in Foreign country is 
perfectly inelastic ( 0DFη = ) ( )1DHDH SH SF
ρη
ρη φη φ η− − −  between 0 and 1 domestic 
8. 
Fuel demand in Foreign country is 
perfectly elastic ( DFη → −∞ ) 1 1 international 
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Table 2: continued 
          Limiting value of a parameter Magnitude of market leakage Interval for magnitude Location of leakage** 
9. 
Gasoline supply in Home country is 
perfectly inelastic ( 0SHη = ) 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
DH DF
DH DF SF
ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η φ η
+ −
+ − − −  between 0 and 1 domestic & international
 
 
10. 
Gasoline supply in Home country is 
perfectly elastic ( SHη →∞ ) 0 0  
11. 
Gasoline supply in Foreign country 
is perfectly inelastic ( 0SFη = ) 
( )
( )
1
1
DH DF
DH DF SH
ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η φη
+ −
+ − −  between 0 and 1 domestic & international
12. 
Gasoline supply in Foreign country 
is perfectly elastic ( SFη →∞ ) 0 0  
Source: calculated 
* Case of Home country and importer; 2., 3., 8. and 10. are only meaningful for an exporter.  
** Based on equation (3). 
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Table 3: Baseline Values of Market and Carbon Leakages under Trade vs Autarky*
Autarky
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Market Leakage
    Tax credit 0.65 16% 0.57
    Mandate 0.61 -2% 0.52
    Tax credit w/ binding mandate 0.64 9% 0.54
Carbon Leakage
  Incl. iLUC (ξ=0.21)
    Tax credit 2.09 -24% 1.69 -0.44 -0.36
    Mandate 1.90 -56% 1.45 -0.40 -0.31
    Tax credit w/ binding mandate 2.07 -36% 1.55 -0.43 -0.33
  Excl. iLUC (ξ=0.52)
    Tax credit 0.25 -321% 0.09 -0.13 -0.05
    Mandate 0.17 -619% -0.01 -0.09 0.00
    Tax credit w/ binding mandate 0.24 -408% 0.03 -0.12 -0.02
Source: calculated
* Magnitudes of leakage multiplied by 100 are interpreted as percentage.
** The values are calculated as ξ minus total market leakage (with international trade or under autarky). For example, the value -0.43
indicates that one gasoline-equivalent gallon of ethanol emits 1.43 times more carbon emissions than one gallon of gasoline.
Baseline parameters: ρ=0.224, φ=0.074, δ=1.440, ηDH=-0.26, ηDF=-0.40, ηSH=0.20, ηSF=0.20
Domestic share figures are calculated as follows: 
   For market leakage: change in domestic fuel consumption is divided by change in world fuel consumption (all multiplied by 100).
   For carbon leakage: the numerator of the ratio is equal to carbon intensity of ethanol (relative to gasoline) times quantity 
     of ethanol plus change in domestic gasoline consumption; the denominator is equal to carbon intensity of ethanol times quantity 
     of ethanol plus change in world gasoline consumption (all multiplied by 100).
International trade True emissions savings of ethanol**
Total Domestic  share
Trade Autarky
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Table 4a: Sensitivity Analysis for Magnitude of Leakage Including iLUC (ξ=0.21): Trade *
Home supply elasticity of gasoline (ηSH) 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00
    Market leakage: Tax credit 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53
                                  Consumption mandate 0.62 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.48 0.47
    Carbon leakage: Tax credit 2.13 2.09 2.01 1.93 1.86 1.80 1.73 1.67 1.61 1.55 1.50
                                   Consumption mandate 1.94 1.90 1.81 1.72 1.65 1.57 1.50 1.43 1.36 1.30 1.24
Foreign supply elasticity of gasoline (ηSF) 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00
    Market leakage: Tax credit 0.77 0.65 0.49 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16
                                  Consumption mandate 0.75 0.61 0.43 0.32 0.25 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07
    Carbon leakage: Tax credit 2.69 2.09 1.33 0.87 0.56 0.34 0.17 0.05 -0.06 -0.14 -0.21
                                   Consumption mandate 2.56 1.90 1.05 0.54 0.20 -0.05 -0.24 -0.38 -0.50 -0.59 -0.67
Home demand elasticity of fuel (ηDH) -0.10 -0.20 -0.40 -0.60 -0.80 -1.00 -1.20 -1.40 -1.60 -1.80 -2.00
    Market leakage: Tax credit 0.62 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.79
                                  Consumption mandate 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
    Carbon leakage: Tax credit 1.97 2.05 2.17 2.28 2.38 2.47 2.54 2.61 2.67 2.72 2.77
                                   Consumption mandate 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.90 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89
Foreign demand elasticity of fuel (ηDF) -0.10 -0.20 -0.40 -0.60 -0.80 -1.00 -1.20 -1.40 -1.60 -1.80 -2.00
    Market leakage: Tax credit 0.40 0.52 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88 0.89
                                  Consumption mandate 0.34 0.46 0.61 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.88
    Carbon leakage: Tax credit 0.93 1.46 2.09 2.45 2.68 2.84 2.96 3.05 3.13 3.19 3.24
                                   Consumption mandate 0.60 1.19 1.90 2.30 2.55 2.74 2.87 2.97 3.05 3.12 3.18
Source: calculated
* Magnitudes of leakage multiplied by 100 are interpreted as percentage.
Note: Shaded areas pertain to baseline.
Parameters values unless otherwise specified: ρ = 0.224, φ = 0.074, δ = 1.44, ηSH = 0.2, ηSF = 0.2, ηDH = -0.26, ηDF = -0.4
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Table 4b: Sensitivity Analysis for Magnitude of Leakage Excluding iLUC (ξ=0.52): Trade *  **
Home supply elasticity of gasoline (ηSH) 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00
    Carbon leakage: Tax credit 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.01
                                   Consumption mandate 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09
Foreign supply elasticity of gasoline (ηSF) 0.10 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00
    Carbon leakage: Tax credit 0.49 0.25 -0.06 -0.25 -0.37 -0.46 -0.53 -0.58 -0.62 -0.65 -0.68
                                   Consumption mandate 0.44 0.17 -0.17 -0.38 -0.52 -0.62 -0.69 -0.75 -0.80 -0.83 -0.87
Home demand elasticity of fuel (ηDH) -0.10 -0.20 -0.40 -0.60 -0.80 -1.00 -1.20 -1.40 -1.60 -1.80 -2.00
    Carbon leakage: Tax credit 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.52
                                   Consumption mandate 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Foreign demand elasticity of fuel (ηDF) -0.10 -0.20 -0.40 -0.60 -0.80 -1.00 -1.20 -1.40 -1.60 -1.80 -2.00
    Carbon leakage: Tax credit -0.22 -0.01 0.25 0.39 0.49 0.55 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.71
                                   Consumption mandate -0.35 -0.11 0.17 0.33 0.44 0.51 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.66 0.69
Source: calculated
* Market leakage is the same as in Table 4a.
** Magnitudes of leakage multiplied by 100 are interpreted as percentage.
Note: Shaded areas pertain to baseline.
Parameters values unless otherwise specified: ρ = 0.224, φ = 0.074, δ = 1.44, ηSH = 0.2, ηSF = 0.2, ηDH = -0.26, ηDF = -0.4
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Figure 1: Biofuels Leakage with a Tax Credit and Trade
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Figure 2: Biofuels Leakage with a Consumption Mandate and Trade
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Appendix 1: Formula for market leakage due to a tax credit 
The equilibrium in world gasoline market with E gallons of ethanol produced due to a 
blender’s tax credit is given by: 
                                            ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )H G F G H G F GD P D P S P S P E+ = + +                                (A1-1) 
where D denotes demand for fuel, S supply of gasoline, PG  world price of gasoline, and 
subscripts H and F denote the Home and Foreign country, respectively. 
Totally differentiating (A1-1), we get: 
                                                      1 0
' ' ' '
G
H F H F
dP
dE D D S S
= <+ − −                                        (A1-2) 
A change in Home country fuel consumption due to introduction of E gallons of ethanol is   
                                   ( )
1 0
' ' ' '
H H G H
DH
G G H F H F
dD dD dP D
dE dP dE P D D S S
η= = >+ − −                      (A1-3) 
Similarly for the change in gasoline consumption in the Foreign country: 
                                   ( )
1 0
' ' ' '
F F G F
DF
G G H F H F
dD dD dP D
dE dP dE P D D S S
η= = >+ − −                       (A1-4) 
Market leakage due to a blender’s tax credit ML
τ is defined as 
                                          ( )' ' ' 'HF FG DH H DF FM G H F H F
dC dC D DL
E P D D S S
τ η η+ += = + − −                          (A1-5) 
After transformation of the derivatives of the demand and supply curves into the elasticity forms, 
we get the final formula for market leakage with a tax credit 
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
DH DF
M
DH DF SH SH
Lτ
ρη ρ η
ρη ρ η φη φ η
+ −= + − − − −  
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where ( )H H FD D Dρ = + and ( )H H FS S Sφ = + . The symbol η denotes elasticity and the 
notation of the subscripts is the same as in (A1-1), so for example DHη denoted demand elasticity 
in the Home country. 
Proof of Proposition 1  
From (A1-2) for the Home country types A and B, we have 
    
* * * * * *
* *
1
1
A
G G
A A A A A A
A AH F H F DH H DF F SH H SF F
DH DF SH SF
G G G G
B
G G
B B B B B B
B BH F H F DH H DF F SH H SF F
DH DF SH SF
G G G G
dP P
D D S SdE D D S S
P P P P
dP P
D D S SdE D D S S
P P P P
η η η ηη η η η
η η η ηη η η η
⎛ ⎞ = =⎜ ⎟ + − −⎝ ⎠ + − −
⎛ ⎞ = =⎜ ⎟ + − −⎝ ⎠ + − −
  (A1-6) 
where the star (*) in the case of country B signifies that the elasticities and quantities might be 
different from those for country A. 
The condition ( ) ( )A BG GdP dE dP dE< is equivalent to 
                                             
* * * *
1
B B B B
DH H DF F SH H SF F
A A A A
DH H DF F SH H SF F
D D S S
D D S S
η η η η
η η η η
+ − −− < −+ − −                                 (A1-7) 
Market leakage seen by the Home country type A is less than by type B if 
* *
* * * *
A B
M M
A A B B
DH H DF F DH H DF F
A A A A B B B B
DH H DF F SH H SF F DH H DF F SH H SF F
L L
D D D D
D D S S D D S S
τ τ
η η η η
η η η η η η η η
<
+ +<+ − − + − −
 
This is equivalent to 
                                  
* * * * * *B B B B B B
DH H DF F SH H SF F DH H DF F
A A A A A A
DH H DF F SH H SF F DH H DF F
D D S S D D
D D S S D D
η η η η η η
η η η η η η
+ − − +<+ − − +                       (A1-8) 
Finally, summing (A1-7) and (A1-8) and rearranging, we get the required condition 
* *B B A A
DH H DF F DH H DF FD D D Dη η η η+ < +  
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Appendix 2: Derivation of elasticities of excess supply and demand curves 
 
At a price p the Foreign country will export gasoline in the amount of: 
                                              ( ) ( ) ( )F FX p S p D p= −                                               (A2-1) 
Differentiating both sides of (A2-1) with respect to the price and manipulating, we obtain: 
                  
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
F F
F F F F
F F
F F
ES SF DF
F F
ES SF DF
F F F F
dX p dS p dD p
dp dp dp
dX p X p dS p S p dD p D pp p p
dp X p p dp S p p dp D p p
S D
X X
S D
S D S D
η η η
η η η
= −
= −
= −
= −− −
           (A2-2) 
where ESη denotes the elasticity of excess supply and the remaining notation is the same as in 
Appendix 1. 
Multiplying both the numerator and the denominator of (A2-2) by 1/Cw, where Cw is 
world gasoline consumption, we obtain: 
F F
w w
ES SF DF
F F F F
w w w w
S D
C C
S D S D
C C C C
η η η= −
− −
 
which can be re-written using the notation from Appendix 1 as: 
                                                      1 1ES SF DF
φ ρη η ηρ φ ρ φ
− −= −− −                                               (A2-3) 
Similarly, for the excess demand curve we obtain: 
                                                      ED DH SH
ρ φη η ηρ φ ρ φ= −− −                                              (A2-4) 
Therefore, a small importer faces a perfectly elastic excess supply curve when SFη →∞ ; a 
small exporter faces a perfectly elastic excess demand curve when DHη → −∞ ; and irrespective 
of the trade position, a small country faces a perfectly elastic trade curve whenever ρ φ→  (the 
case analyzed in the paper).                                                    
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Appendix 3: Derivation of market leakage formula with a consumption mandate 
World fuel market equilibrium with a binding consumption mandate and a blender’s tax 
credit in the Home country is given by: 
                                     
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
HF H F
FG F G
HG HG G
FG FG G
E E
HF
F E c G
HF HF
HF FG HG FG
C D P
C D P
Q S P
Q S P
E S P
E C EP P t t P t
C C
C C Q Q E
=
=
=
=
=
−= + − + +
+ = + +
                                    (A3-1) 
where the first subscript denotes country (H = Home, F = Foreign), the second denotes either 
fuel F or gasoline G. The letter E represents the amount of ethanol that is mandated. The 
blender’s tax credit is denoted by tc and a fuel tax by t. The remaining notation is the same as in 
Appendix 1. 
 Totally differentiating the system of equations in (A3-1), we get: 
( )
2
'
'
'
'
'
HF H F
FG F G
HG HG G
FG FG G
E E
E G cE G c HF
F E c G HF
HF HF HF HF HF
HF FG HG FG
dC D dP
dC D dP
dQ S dP
dQ S dP
dE S dP
E P P tP P t E E C EdP dE dP dt dt dP dC
C C C C C
dC dC dQ dQ dE
=
=
=
=
=
− −− − −= + + − + −
+ = + +
  
(A3-2) 
Solving the linearized system (A3-2) for HFdC dE  and FGdC dE  and converting the 
derivatives into the elasticity forms, we obtain: 
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( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1 1
E G c DH E G DH HF
DH
F E F HF F SH HG SF FG DF FGHF
E G c G DH HF
DH
HF F HF F SH HG SF FG DF FG
P P t P E P C
P P C P Q Q CdC
P P tdE E E P C
C P C P Q Q C
η ηη η η η η
ηη η η η
− − ⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟ + −⎝ ⎠= − − ⎛ ⎞+ − −⎜ ⎟ + −⎝ ⎠
  (A3-3) 
( ) ( )
( )
1
1 1 1
E G c E G cDH E
DH DH
FG F E F HF F
E G c SH HG SF FG DH G HF
DH
HF F DF FG HF DF F FG
P P t P P tP E
dC P P C P
dE P P tE Q Q E P C
C P C C P C
ηη ηη
η η ηη η η
− − − −+ − −
= ⎛ ⎞− − ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞++ − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
(A3-4) 
Let us first analyze the situation with a binding consumption mandate alone, i.e., tc = 0. 
Evaluate the derivatives (A3-3) and (A3-4) at E = 0 and use the fact that the ethanol supply curve 
is perfectly elastic around that point.27 
After some simplifications, we get: 
                 
( )0 0 0 0
0
0 0 0 0 0
1E DH SH HG SF FG DF FG DH HG
GHF
E SH HG SF FG DH HG DF FG
P Q Q C C
PdC
dE Q Q C C
η η η η η
η η η η=
⎛ ⎞− + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= + − −

          (A3-5) 
                            
0
0
0 0 0 0 0
1 1EDH DF FG
GFG
E SH HG SF FG DH HG DF FG
P C
PdC
dE Q Q C C
η η
η η η η=
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠= + − −

                        (A3-6) 
where the additional subscript 0 is meant to denote the initial equilibrium with no ethanol (hence 
also the changed notation for consumption of gasoline in the Home country, 0HGC ) and 
EP denotes the vertical intercept of the inverse ethanol supply curve. 
For a mandate to bind, it must be the case that 0 1E GP P δ= > . Multiplying both the 
numerators and the denominators of (A3-5) and (A3-6) by 01 C , where C0 denotes world 
consumption of gasoline in the absence of ethanol, we arrive at: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )0
1 1 1
1 1
DH SH SF DF DHHF
E SH SF DH DF
dC
dE
δ η φη φ η ρ η ρη
φη φ η ρη ρ η=
− + − − − −= + − − − −  
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( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )0
1 1 1
1 1
DF DHFG
E SH SF DH DF
dC
dE
ρ η η δ
φη φ η ρη ρ η=
− − −= + − − − −  
Since we have assumed no ethanol in the initial equilibrium, with a consumption mandate of E 
gallons of ethanol we must have dE E= . Therefore, the change in fuel consumption after the 
mandate has been introduces is: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1
DH SH SF DF DH
HF
SH SF DH DF
dC E
δ η φη φ η ρ η ρη
φη φ η ρη ρ η
− + − − − −= + − − − −  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
0
1 1
DF DH
FG
SH SF DH DF
dC E
ρ η η δ
φη φ η ρη ρ η
− − −= >+ − − − −  
Note that while the change in domestic fuel consumption is ambiguous, gasoline consumption in 
the Foreign country always increases when a consumption biofuel mandate is introduced in the 
Home country. 
Finally, market leakage with a consumption mandate ML
σ  is given by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1
DH SH SF DH DFHF FG
M
SH SF DH DF
dC dCL
E
σ δ η φη φ η ρη ρ η
φη φ η ρη ρ η
− + − − − −+= = + − − − −  
It is easy to show that 1ML
σ < , but it is not bounded from below, i.e., can also be negative 
meaning that one than one gallon of gasoline can be replaced with one gallon of ethanol. This 
happens whenever ( ) ( )( )
1
1
1
DH DF
DH
SH SF
ρη ρ ηδ η φη φ η
+ −− < + − . 
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Appendix 4: Change in the World Gasoline Price when a Tax Credit is added to a Binding 
Consumption Mandate 
 
Solving (A3-2) for the change in the world gasoline price we obtain: 
                   
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
2
'' 1 '
'
' ' ' 1 ' '
'
' ' ' 1 ' '
E G cE G c H
H H
HF HF E HF
G
E G c HF
HG FG F H H
HF HF
H
HF
c
E G c HF
HG FG F H H
HF HF
E P P tP P t E DD D
C C S C
dP dE
E P P t C ES S D D D
C C
E D
C dt
E P P t C ES S D D D
C C
⎛ ⎞− −− − + − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= ⎛ ⎞− − −+ − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
− ⎛ ⎞− − −+ − + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
              (A4-1) 
Evaluating (A4-1) at E = 0 and tc = 0, and noting that after introduction of ethanol dE E= , we 
get: 
0, 0
' 1
0
' ' ' 'c
E G
H
HF
G E t
HG FG F H
P P D
C
dP E
S S D D= =
⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= <+ − −

 
which means that the world gasoline price decreases as a tax credit is added to a binding 
consumption mandate. 
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Appendix 5: Data sources 
Parameter/Variable Symbol Value Source/explanation 
U.S. oil consumption CHO 17,491   1,000 bpd EIA 
U.S. oil production QHO 5,783   1,000  bpd EIA 
World oil consumption CWO 78,006   1,000  bpd EIA 
U.S. ethanol production QE 698   1,000  bpd FAPRI 
Gasoline production out of one barrel 
of crude oil θ  0.46 θ =19.5/42 
Miles per gallon of ethanol relative to 
gasoline * λ  0.70 de Gorter and Just (2008b) 
U.S. gasoline consumption share ρ  0.224 ρ = CHO/CWO 
U.S. gasoline production share φ  0.074 φ = QHO/CWO  
Intercept of the inverse U.S. ethanol 
supply curve EP
  $1.77/gallon calculated following de Gorter and Just (2009d)  
U.S. gasoline price  PG $1.76/gallon NEO 
Ratio of the intercept of the ethanol 
supply curve and gasoline market 
price under no ethanol production 
δ  1.44 ( )0.7E GP Pδ =   
U.S. ethanol blender’s tax credit tc $0.52/gallon 
$0.45/gallon federal + 
$0.07/gallon average state 
U.S. fuel demand elasticity  DHη  -0.26 Hamilton (2009) 
ROW fuel demand elasticity DFη  -0.40 de Gorter and Just (2009a) 
U.S. gasoline supply elasticity SHη  0.20 de Gorter and Just (2009a) 
ROW gasoline supply elasticity  SFη  0.20 assumed equal to SHη  
U.S. ethanol supply elasticity Eη  1.00 calculated following de Gorter and Just (2009a)  
Note: all data refer to 2009 
bpd – barrels per day 
* Although a gallon of ethanol has only 0.66 energy content of a gallon of gasoline, miles 
traveled is 0.70 (see de Gorter and Just 2008b) 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The literature uses the term carbon leakage to refer to an unintended increase in carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
green house gas emissions due to an environmental policy which is aimed at their reduction. We adopt this term to 
be consistent with the terminology, but in our paper carbon leakage is a proxy for a more general type of 
leakage−greenhouse gas emissions leakage. 
 
2 See Wooders et al. (2009) for a survey.  
 
3 There are endless studies on iLUC. For just a few surveys, see Fonseca et al. (2010); Al-Riffai, et al. (2010); 
European Commission (2010); Fabiosa et al. (2009); Plevin et al. (2010); Farrel et al. (2006); Kline et al. (2009); 
Lapola et al. (2010) and Edwards et al. (2010). 
 
4 See for example, Alexeeva-Talebi et al. (2008); Fischer and Fox (2009); Bordoff (2009); Brewer (2008); Green 
and Epps (2008); Pauwelyn (2007) and Winchester et al. (2010). 
  
5 See Vöhringer et al. (2006); Murray (2008); Muller (2009); Raymond (2010); Schneider (2007); and Schneider 
and Cames (2009). The Clean Development Mechanism is also concerned with permanence. The concepts of 
additionality and leakage are included in the measures developed in this paper, while permanence is addressed in the 
conclusion of this paper when discussing the implications of the emerging literature on the Green Paradox for the 
leakage measures developed here. 
 
6 The term “indirect output use change” (iOUC) was coined by de Gorter and Just (2009b) to emphasize how 
arbitrary the emphasis on iLUC was while not analyzing iOUC. For further developments of this concept, see de 
Gorter (2010a,b,c,d) and Drabik and de Gorter (2010).  
 
7 However, with a biofuel mandate it can be the case that the direct emissions reduction can be strengthened, leading 
to higher carbon reductions than originally intended. 
 
8 In this paper, we use a partial equilibrium framework to analyze carbon leakage. For a discussion of differences 
between partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models for analysis of carbon leakage see Karp (2010). 
 
9 Life-cycle accounting that underpins the 0,1 sustainability thresholds, like the U.S. requirement that corn-ethanol 
reduce GHG emissions by 20 percent relative to gasoline, assumes one gallon of ethanol (gasoline equivalent) 
replaces one gallon of gasoline.  
 
10 Because a mandate taxes the gasoline market, it is possible that market leakage in the fuel market is negative, 
possibly replacing more than a gallon of gasoline.  
 
11 The two effects act in the same direction if market leakage is negative. 
 
12 In deriving this formula, we make four assumptions: (i) no “technical leakage”, i.e., the emissions intensities of 
dirty energy source are the same in both countries; (ii) dirty and clean energy sources are perfect substitutes in 
consumption (in energy equivalents), most notably so for gasoline and ethanol; (iii). all clean energy (ethanol) saves 
the same amount of carbon relative to dirty energy, e.g., corn-ethanol is assumed to emit the same amount of carbon 
as that produced from sugar cane; (iv) no prior consumption of ethanol in either country. 
13 Indirect land use changes denote additional land that is converted to produce biofuels. In the process, carbon 
emissions incur not only by biofuels production and their combustion, but also by the additional land conversion. 
 
14 The weight of the carbon dioxide produced by burning a gallon of gasoline is 19.56 pounds, while that produced 
by burning a gallon of ethanol is 12.57 pounds. The latter figure becomes 17.95 if adjusted for mileage, yielding the 
emissions savings effect ξ = 0.08. 
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15 This is the approach taken by the Nobel Laureate IPCC who gives biofuels a value of zero in their accounting 
balance tables. 
 
16 A small importer faces no market leakage provided that production technology in the Foreign country exhibits 
constant returns to scale that render the Foreign gasoline supply curve perfectly elastic. On the other hand, a small 
exporter sees 100 percent market leakage, if the fuel demand curve in the rest of the world is perfectly elastic. 
  
17 Fuel price does also respond ambiguously to changes in the quantity of the mandated ethanol, with the result 
heavily depending on market elasticities and the share of ethanol in total fuel consumption: 
( )1 11 1 1F G DF GDFE G E G
F SE SG G SG G F F SG F
dP P PEEP P P P
C Q Q C P PdE
ηη
η η η η
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤= + − − − + − −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
 
where SGη , SEη , and SEη are elasticities of the gasoline and ethanol supply curves, and fuel demand curve, 
respectively; CF denotes fuel consumption and QG gasoline production. Explanation of other variables is the same as 
in section 4. 
 
18 This parallels the U.S. case, as the United States is the world’s largest ethanol producer; is an oil importer and has 
a consumption mandate.  
 
19 For an original account of what happens when adding a tax credit to a blend mandate, see de Gorter (2007; 
2009a). 
 
20 If the tax credit is less than the mandate premium (which almost has to be the case in reality when the mandate 
binds), then the market leakage in the large country case can still be positive but may become negative if the 
mandate alone generates negative leakage; otherwise leakage is more positive than mandate alone. 
 
21 In this paper, we do not distinguish gasoline consumption between transportation and non-transportation use to 
estimate leakage. The analysis in Drabik and de Gorter (2010) shows that such a division has little effect on leakage 
estimates. 
 
22 Alternatively, the effect of including iLUC is very similar to assuming a direct life-cycle accounting measure of 
20 percent as all studies on biofuels have done to date because the revised EPA estimates in 2010 are very recent 
and have not been incorporated in studies yet. 
 
23 One can view the results thus: when including iLUC, the results can also double for a what if you assumed direct 
life-cycle accounting emissions of 20 percent less than gasoline as all studies to date (and before the recent EPA 
ruling for RFS2), while the other results that include iLUC and the new EPA estimate of direct emissions are a 
unique situation itself. 
 
24 While under autarky market leakage is all domestic by definition, the domestic component of market leakage is 
often very small as a share of total leakage with international trade. 
 
25 Two columns are highlighted in Tables 4a, 4b and 5 because the baseline value of the Home fuel demand 
elasticity (-0.26) lies between the values presented in the tables, namely -0.20 and -0.40. 
 
26 For arguments not to include iLUC, see de Gorter and Just (2009b). However, there is widespread disagreement 
with this view so this paper presents both possibilities. 
 
27 We assume that the ethanol supply curve is differentiable in the neighborhood of E = 0 and that its slope is 
globally strictly positive. Then, from the definition of elasticity, it follows that
0 0
lim lim E EE
E E E
dS P
dP E
η+ +→ →= = ∞
 , where 
EP denotes the intercept of the inverse ethanol supply curve with the vertical axis. 
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